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Achtung! This text presents its ideas often more as a kind of synopsis than as a well formulated argument.
Future versions of the text will try to remedy this defect. Note that the version number is part of the title. It is
recommended to quote this text including the version number and check for new versions before quoting.
1 Introduction
According to Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan capital is not an economic quantity but a mode of
power [29]; it could be sumarized as: “Capital is power quantified in monetary terms”. So, what do we do
when we “quantify”? What is the nature of “money” in a capitalist society? And, indeed, what is “power” in
the first place?
In the following I will try to develop a concept of power as the ability of persons to create particular
formations. The kind of formations persons can think of depends on the society a person lives in, which
can be identified by what Cornelius Castoriadis called its social imaginary significations (SIS). The core
SIS of capitalism is rational mastery operating with computational rationality. Computational rationality
in turn rest on a particular understanding of how signification works: operational symbolism, as theories
by Sybille Krämer (following Leibniz). When the concept of the SIS of modern rationality was developed
in the 1950s and 60s, bureaucracy was seen as its main organisational mode or rational mastery. I will
argue that capitalisation and bureaucratisation are the twomodes of rational mastery which interact with
each other. The paper concludes with deliberations on the future of rational mastery and the possibility
of “ways out”.
2 Power, Gestaltungsvermögen {sec:power}
2.1 From wealth to Vermögen
In English, of persons who own a variety of assets which have a certain monetary value, one says that they
have a certainwealth. In English it is not clear how wealth “as such” should relate to power. The situtation
is different inGerman: the direct translation of “wealth” is “Vermögen”, sometimes even “Kapitalvermögen”.
You say, Mr Gates has a Vermögen of $100 billion etc. Now, Vermögen is also used more generally to
denote ability to do something, the “power to. . . ”. Indeed etymologically Vermögen belongs to the same
group as does the GermanMacht which is the direct translation of “power” especially in political contexts.
These go back to the Indoeuropean rootmagh which means ability or power, and fromwhich derive all
kinds of related English words likemight,mechanics,machine andmany others, evenmagician; there is
also the closely related rootmagˆh which means fight or struggle [24].
So, in German “capital is (identical to) power” is already built into the language (an etymologically
English equivalent to Kapitalvermögen would be capital might instead of wealth or asset). The usage
of Vermögen for financial wealth apparently seems to have started around 1500 [38]. This is the age
of German protocapitalists, most notably Jacob Fugger of Augsburg (1459–1525), whose byname was
“the Rich” and who, at the end of his life, controlled 70% of European silver production, silver being the
foundation of the hard money of the age. The ability of Fugger and other rich men to turn their business
success into political influence (Jacob Fugger was responsible, i.e. payed for, Charles V to become emperor
of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) in 1519) in an age that was otherwise still feudalist, was reflected in the
“folk books” (early popular printed story books) of “Dr Faustus” (about the magician who seeks power by a
pact with the devil) and “Fortunatus” which plays out the possibilities its main character has with a purse
which contains money each time he opens it [34].
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2.2 Gestaltungsvermögen
So now we have Vermögen, the financial wealth as well as the ability to. . . . But to what? Very generally we
can say: the world changes. Say that at some time t0 the world is in a state s0. Without action of person p
the world will be in state s1 at t1, the trajectory from s0 to s1 could be called the “curse of events” (Lauf der
Dinge). Assume p wants the world to be in state s01 instead. If p can act in such a way as to actually achieve
what they want, we would say p has the ability or Vermögen to do so. I shall call the act of altering the
curse of events an act of formation, or Gestaltungstätigkeit. In this context, form / formation / Gestalten
are to be understood very generally as genuine acts of creation, not just changes of something already
existing (this is more natural for “Gestaltung” than for “formation”).
(At this point, I avoid Bichler/Nitzans term “creorder” [29], partly because I have been unable to find a
good translation into German, but also to underline that a Gestalt/formation need no be fully ordered:
Gestaltungstätigkeit may create disorder as well.)
Adding to this that since things do not change by themselves as the acting person want (otherwise that
would be the natural curse of events and no action necessary), hence they have to overcome resistance.
Running this together we get power = the ability to create formations against resistance which otherwise
would not occur = Gestaltungsvermögen (“formation-ability”). This is a very general definition and, when
applied to formation in the physical realm, can be translated one-to-one into the physical term power =
energy per time, energy being, so to say the (quantification of the) amount of what there is to do and time
how quickly the action is necessary.
2.3 Gesellschaftliches Gestaltungsvermögen
In society (social formation-ability, gesellschaftliches Gestaltungsvermögen), the wish of p1 for the state
of affairs at t1 to be s11 (instead of s1) may meet another person p
2 who would like that state to be s21. If the
two states differ, a conflict arises, a power struggle. And of course the twomay not be alone. Hence, the
social power of any person p is the ability to overcome the combined but not necessarily coordinated
resistance of all other persons with respect to their goals. The goal may be “greater” of “smaller” i.e. the
intended state of the world may be further away or closer to the curse of events. The further away the
more other people are involved / affected hence more resistance is to be expected and hence more power
necessary to overcome it.
We can now say that capitalisation is the quantification of the otherwise only qualitative notion of “greater”
/ “smaller” with respect to what goals can be achieved: in a almost fully capitalised world Bill Gates with
a Vermögen of $100 billion can realise any project for which facilities costing that order of magnitude
can be bought, which is of course more than someone with only $1 income a day. The quantification
is necessarily relative since social ability is relative to social ability of others. And once power conflicts
have started there is a “natural” tendency to turn everything into a means to those conflicts, hence the
tendency for the “capitalisation of everything” [29].
We note that the concept formation-ability and the respective formation action (Gestaltungstätigkeit)
are neutral with respect to whether the action is productive or destructive, which are evaluations which
may differ from the point of view of the different persons. From the point of view of rulers the destructive
capabilities of an army under their command are productive with respect to their quest for power, wheres
the productive capabilities of a plant of the enemy is destructive for their power.
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3 Social imaginary significations
In the previous section we have defined power as the ability to achieve a goal against the resistance of
others with competing goals. But what goals can a person in a given society imagine to achieve? There are
two questions here:
a) what can people imagine is achievable (in principle)? and
b) of what is imagined to be achievable, what isworth to achieve?
The first denotes the limitation (or extent) of their (ability of) imagination (Vorstellungsvermögen), the
second denotes the meaning or signification (Bedeutung) of peoples actions: not everything imaginable is
worth doing. I think this is roughly what Castoriadis has in mind when he says that each society can be
characterised by its “social imaginary significations” (SIS): it is the coherent set of what its members can
imagine and what they think is worth doing and what not [6,11,12].
More generally, the SIS is the idea (Vorstellung) that members of a society have about the world order (it is
their cosmology orWeltbild) the meaning/significance (Sinn) of their lives, what they should do, of that of
others, of the institutions, and the world as a whole. The SIS drives human actions and hence the generate
the process of social change, the “socio-historic”.
Typically, an SIS is closed and include a cosmology: it offers an explanation of anything that happens
in the world. Furthermore SIS are typically thought to be external to the social process: the world and
social formation is thought to be given by God, the forefathers, human nature and so on. That doesn’t
mean the social order is actually something external, it is only imagined to be. Castoriadis calls such SISs
heteronomous. Heteronomy implies that there is no real distinction between nature and society (physis
and nomos).
If the members of a society are conscious of the fact that they themselves are the creators of their social
order we have the SIS of autonomy (from auto, self, and nomos, social formation). Autonomy breakes the
closedness of the SIS and the members of an autonomous society can take advantage of this break-up
to consciously create and change the social formations according to their will, this is “true politics”.
Autonomy raises the question of how far the conscious creation process can go, or what things can’t be
changed due to their “nature”. Hence, autonomy is the discovery of the physis / nomos difference. By
implication, science, the research of the natural environment and hence the extent of physical formation
ability (Gestaltungsvermögen) becomes a socially relevant activity.
Autonomous humans reject authority. They are equal with respect to their participation in political affairs.
(But somemay be more knowlegdeable about special subjects than others.) This implies that there must
be a truly political sphere in an autonomous society where its members cannot just discuss but also
decide on the questions concerning the nomos a public/public sphere, the ecclesia (Castoriadis).
4 Modern Rationality and rational mastery {sec:rat}
According to Castoriadis Western modernity can be characterised by the double SIS of rational mastery
and autonomy [8].
Rational mastery = rationality + mastery is a compositum. I do not think that modern rationality as such
implies mastery. Mastery when combined with rationality has two aspects: the idea that humans can
master nature including their own human nature and that this can be done “rationally”. This turn means
into end: the idea that rationality (a rationally ordered society) is a goal rather than it being the most
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effective way to achieve something that has been decided on (e.g. by the citizens on an autonomous
society).
4.1 Modern rationality: operational symbolism
According to Sybille Krämer modern rationality is computable rationality/reason (berechenbare Vernunft)
[25,26]. Computability = ability to turn an argument into a calculus (Kalkül). The algebraic formula is the
archetype of such a computable form.
4.1.1 The calculus
In a calculus,
a) the construction of symbols and their interpretation are decoupled. The allowed operations do not
depend on what the symbols are supposed to mean in the end.
b) Language becomes a technique (Technik); formal artificial languages, syntactic machines, can be
constructed.
c) Symbols becomemanipulable objects.
4.1.2 Leibniz’ theory of symbols
The theory of symbols which can (and should!) be used for rational calculation (calculus raticionator) was
developed by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716).
a) Symbols are objects that are manipulated according to some rules.
b) Symbols are autonomous with respect to what they signify; they become a calculus, a formal system
whose inner order is independent from the interpretation of the symbols; and the symbols appear
in a new kind of script, the typographic script, which is independent from spoken language.
c) Calculisation and typographisation turn symbols into mechanical production systems, symbolic
machines; artificial languages are a technology.
d) Scientific thought produces knowledge (Erkenntnis); since knowledge production requires symbols,
as a consequence of the above, knowledge is the product of the operation of symbolic machines.
e) As a consequence the objects of knowledge (Gegenstände der Erkenntnis) themselves are also
generated by symbolic machines.
The term symbolism denotes the theory of what and how symbols signify (how the “get their meaning”).
If the signification is the product of some operation according to some rules we can call this theory of
signification operational symbolism.
If one generalises the concept of symbolic machines to language as a whole we get roughly Wittgenstein’s
concept of the language game of the Philosophical Investigations, that is, the meaning of words depends
on how they are used according to more or less (formally) defined rules [31,35,37].
4.2 Predecessors to operational symbolism: ontological and magical symbolism
It is useful to contrast operational symbolism with its predecessors in the Western history of ideas
(philosophy). Western philosophy only concerns us here: capitalism is a product of Western civilisation
and the autonomy project (according to Castoriadis) only emerged twice, in ancient Athens and with
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modernity but not by themselves in outer-European contexts. (But in today’s globalised world everybody
could participate of course)
The immediate predecessor of operational symbolism was ontological symbolism, as conceived by Plato
and Aristotle: the significant of a symbol is an “ideal” object. The model of this symbolism is geometry
(hence, only those who have studied it are ready to enter Plato’s academy): a triangle drawn in sand is
murky, imperfect and so on, but “represents” or refers to the ideal triangle that the drawer “means”. By
way of generalisation, words (“table”, “red”, “zero”,. . . ) denote an ideas which only “somewhat” fit to the
murky reality (reality is imperfect when compared with the ideal world of pure ideas). Since the ideas
are thought to be located somewhere the question arises about their “ontological status”, hence the term
ontological symbolism.
Ontological symbolism has intrinsic problems (some of which were already identified by Plato himself):
where, exactly, can these ideas be found and how do we “access” them; what is the reality of ideas about
fictious or impossible objects (unicorns, circular squares); same question for negative or non-existent
objects (what does “0” signify, how is it possible that adding zeros, signifying nothing, at the and of a
numeral increases the number signified?); what is the idea of an idea (the idea not of a “table” but of the
“idea of a table”), and doen’t that lead to an infinite regress? What about all the words in a sentence that
do not have clear “ideas” behind them (particles, words like “here” and “there”, and so on; the logic of
ontological symbolism, developed by Aristotle, only deals with subjects and predicates).
Ontological symbolism itself was the solution to intrinsic problems of its predecessor,magical symbolism.
Here the signification is thought as a “link” from the symbol to what it represents within this world. For
example the name of a person is “tied” to its bearer, as is a puppet when used by a voodoo priest. In a
sense there is no difference between symbol and its significate. But this direct-link hypothesis breaks
down with abstract objects when there cannot be shown a direct link to exist. In Ancient Greece the
discovery of the “symbolic difference” (Krämer) was due to the Pythagoreans, when they were unable
to construct mathematical objects linke the square root of two by the manipulations of pebbles (their
way of doing math). In a more general context, this type of symbolism operates with concrete prototypes
(e.g. in order to classify an object as a table one compares it with some prototypical object which is known
to be a table). The problem with a concrete prototype is that they have in infinite number of concrete
particular properties yielding the question why a particular object is the prototype and not some other.
The symbolic difference of ontological symbolism implies an ontological difference (ideal vs. real world).
The change frommagical to ontological (Ma!On) as well as the change from ontological to operational
(On!Op) took place in the context of the autonomy project: MaOn in the context of Athenian democracy,
On!Op in the European enlightenment, that is, the modern autonomymovement. Autonomy rejects
that experts decide onmatters that concern the entire society (but experts maybe necessary to implement
decisions taken). But decisions require classification using words (in a debate) and hence the quest ofr a
democratic symbolism arises.
Magical symbolism requires experts (priests) to distinguish prototypes from other objects. The concept
of ideas ideally implies that everybody has equal “access” to them (but this may require training, i.e. ed-
ucation in geometry; Plato thought that the access to the ideas was lost through the shock of birth and
could be brought back by “maieutics”). However, since the ontological problem, the question of were
the idea should be localised, was never solved and eventually Christian ideologues put back the priest
expertism into force (according to Augustinus the ideas are to be found in the mind of people by the
unlimited benevolence of God but only of true Christians — which is why it is nonsensical to have a
serious discussion with heathen for they have not profited from that benevolence so far).
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4.3 Operational symbolism and autonomy
Operational symbolism does not suffer from an access problem: there is the symbolic difference but
no longer an ontological difference. Ideally, anybody can learn the “state of the art” in science and can
contribute to it by constructing their own “symbolic machines”. And there is no creative limit in what
symbolic machines can be created. Older symbolism were tied, so to say, to the actual world, they were
static. Operational symbolism is dynamic.
Modern science is part of the autonomy project because
a) it is ideally open for the contribution by everyone whomakes the required effort to learn the state
of the art;
b) its results are relevant for the possibilities of the formation of social order, i.e. what is possible to
achieve physically (the physis / nomos difference);
c) modern rationality (symbolic machines) do not limit creativity (the explosion of modernmathe-
matics is an example: any set of axioms is effectively such a machine).
4.4 Two modes of rational mastery: capital and bureaucracy
Modern rationality becomes the antithesis to autonomy when it becomes an end in itself and enters
the hubris of unlimited mastery. That is, when the social order should be the implementation of some
kind of imagined rationality (rational order). Example: typically, modern utopias, like those of Morus et
al., present the contradiction: one the one hand, the societies are conscious creations of its citizens but
at the same time they implement some kind of “objectively” rational social order. The self-referential
application of rationality as an end in itself plus hubris is the “mastery” aspect of rational mastery.
I propose that there are twomodes of rational mastery:
a) the extension of the command of property and its monetary quantification, or capitalisation.
b) procedural rationality institutionalised as bureaucracy: an organisation’s rational goals are calcu-
lated and implemented using formal procedures by an hierarchical organisation which is created
according to alleged rational principles.
The twomodes exist side by side to each other, indeed, capitalising organisations (e.g. corporations) are
typically internally organised as bureaucratic hierarchies, and there are “feedback mechanisms” between
the twomodes (see sec. 7).
Rational mastery is actually a pseudorational pseudomastery: it is not rational and it fails because of its
own operations. As we will see it is also autocatalytic: the process of increasing rational mastery yields its
own growth.
5 Property, credit, money
Capitalisation is defined as
K = aE ,
where K is the capitalisation in monetary units, E is the (expected or past) earnings in monetary units,
and a is the product of accumulation factors (pure numbers) [29]. In the present analysis of Capital As
Power, the accumulation factors are hype, inverted risk, and the reciprocal average rate of return. We
note that by the very fact that that the capitalisation is an algebraic formula capitalisation is a symbolic
machine in the sense of S. Kräamer. But capitalists do not just generate knowledge by capitalisation
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(although any such number conceptually contains the observations of how a capitalist sees “all” of society,
like a hologram does [29]), more importanly, they try to make things happen that is they exercise mastery
on society. Thus capitalisation is both, an “engine” and a “camera” but, indeed, mostly the former [28].
Earnings may be expected future earnings (but in times of “systemic fear”, past earnings [5]). Just like
formulae in science are inventions of scientists which are “tested” by empirical observation (= another set
of formulae), capitalisation is an operation done by business people etc who “test” if it works out or not.
What we need to understand is, howmoney and property are “linked”. The subsections up to sec. 5.3 I will
develop the property theory of money as developed by Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steier, and Hans-Joachim
Stadermann [22,32,33] in the context of Capital As Power (see now also Graeber [19]).
5.1 Property
Property / ownership, legal definition: Ownership is the right to enjoy (use) and dispose of things in the
most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations (Code
Napoléon, Art. 544 [27]). As with Vermögen, in German things are evenmore exlicit. Again, the German
legal conceptualisation is evenmore explicit: “Das Eigentumsrecht ist ein umfassendes Herrschaftsrecht”
(property is a comprehensive right of domination / rule [39,40])
Observations:
a) The definition in the Code Napoléon is the prototype of bourgeois, hence capitalist property law
(but the definition goes back to the Romans).
b) The definition distinguishes two distinct rights, the right to use (“enjoy”) and the right to dispose of
things owned.
c) Owners may dispose of things as follows: they may commodify them, i.e. sell them against payment
(in which case the things are not longer owned by them of course); they may rent them for a fee (in
which case someone else “enjoys” them); and they may collateralise them in a credit contract in
addition to renting or using them. Collateralisation is independent from who uses the things.
d) It is the right to dispose of things, which include the right to generate earnings from them.
e) These rights may be exercised “in the most absolute manner”. In feudalism, property rights were
always particular rights, restricted by tradition, religion, customs, etc., any use outside those
restrictions could nullify the ownership right.
f) Restrictions must be explicit laws made by the state. But the bourgeois state itself is a creation by
the very property owners who subjugate themselves under its law. Hence the fights over restrictions,
whether to impose them or not, becomes part and parcel of business operations = differential
acumulation.
5.2 Money creation through credit
Modern capitalism starts in the city states of late Medieval and Renaissance Europe as business done
by merchants who formed networks of “consenting owners” (often parts of very few families) extending
across European cities and courts. Within these networks business could be done via debt records (tallies)
and clearings or negotiable instruments (the money of the merchants) which was safer than actual
valuables like silver coins (which could be stolen and needed to be handled and transported). In order to
be “eligible” as a debtor a merchant needed property as collateral. Certificates collateralised by property
can circulate as money. We can distinguish debtor’s money and creditor’s money.
Suppose we have an owner of an “interesting” object, say a silver mine. The owners would like to exploit
the mine (“enjoy” digging out the silver in it). For this equipment andminers are necessary which may
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come from places far away. Suppose the owners have no money or other valuable goods to pay, what
should they do? They could issue notes backed up with the silver to be digged out. This way the mine
owner would be a debtor who issues notes backed by their property. This is debtor’s money.
Suppose that the mine owner is relatively unknown outside its neighborhood. In this case they would
have problems getting their notes accepted outside that neighborhood. Now suppose there is a rich well
known merchant house in the neighborhood with branches in many outside areas. The mine owners
could now go to the merchant house and ask them to supply notes promising its bearer to pay a certain
amount of property, a promise backed by the merchant houses property, assuming that such notes would
be accepted thanks to the reputation of the merchant house. Themine owners will need to promise to pay
back the value of the bills (e.g. in form of the silver digged out). The merchant house will ask in return, for
(a) some extra payment, the interest, and (b) some property (e.g. the mine) as collateral / security should
the mne owners fail to pay. In this case the merchant house is the creditor of the mine owners, and he bill
issued is creditor’s money. It is this type of creditor’s money which got the early banking houses started in
Italy from the 14th century.
Let us note several points:
a) The obligation of the debtor who receives the bills from the bank, as well as the amount one on the
bill are nominal units. If the bill promises to its holder “one florin” any items worth this amount
may be sufficient.
b) Both, debtor as well as creditor are owners of property. In early banking (indeed until almost the
20th century) non-owners are not creditworthy. The whole point of the operation is that both
remain owners of their respective property. They dispose of their property in such a way that they
remain both in possession and disposition of their property.
c) There is the default risk, the danger that the debtor cannot pay back its debt which is bad luck
for the creditor, especially if the debtor’s collateral turns out not to be worth the amount credited.
Typically, the creditor may ask for different collateral or change the credit arrangement. The latter is
particularly the case with credits to sovereign. (The Bank of England was effectively created when
after a lost war with France the creditors to the crown demanded other means of being repaid—
thus was born the eternal state credit, taxation and the lottery of England.)
d) It is also possible that the receivers of the merchants bills immediately turn to the merchant and
demand the promise to be payed. The “art of banking” consist of this not happening: if the bank is
very trustworthy it may be muchmore useful for the owner of its bills to use the bills for their own
business as a means of payment. Once this procedure is institutionalised bank notes can become
“legal tender”.
e) The possibility of the notes promise asked to be fulfilled, however, created the need for the bank to
hold back enough own property to eventually fulfill such demands. Hence a certain fraction of the
banks property is “locked” to “secure” the bills issued.
f) Interest is charged because otherwise the owner (merchant, bank) would simply not be “interested”
in giving credit. Interest is a “premium” for the collateralisation of property, hence a “property
premium” [22]. As a consequence there is no property-based money without an interest. A risk
premium may, of course, be charged in addition to make up for lack of information about the
debtor and/or his collateral and of general circumstances which are always mostly unknown (“fog
of business” to take up the respective concept from physical power struggles [14]), or for the risk of
holders of the bills asking for their promise.
g) There is the story that in England gold smiths were some of the first bankers who used gold deposits
of their customers (made to secure them) as a collateral for issuing bank notes. According to
Heinsohn/Steiger this gold smith’s story is often confused. Those banks were set up by wealthy
owners who put in their own property.
h) What happens if a holder of a note offers it to the issuing bank? Instead of fulfilling the promise of
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payment (which threatens the property base) the bankmay offer to record the sum in an account for
that person and pay an interest, i.e. a premium for non-fulfillment. And since there will be a greater
promise at the end of the period the bank can only prevent payment by promising the interest on
the account for the original sum plus the interest promised so far, thus leading to the phenomenon
of compound interest.
5.3 Institutionalisation of money creation
When the monetisation of society became the rule, there was an increased the threat of holders of bank
notes demanding payment of the promise thus ruin the bank (e.g. the free banking era in the USA up
to the 20th century). Thus the money issuing institution needed be shielded from direct contact with
society at large. The crediting operation was separated from the money creation: a reserve system was
created, where a central bank took over the money supply to commercial banks who continue to do the
ordinary the credit operations. But also money supply itself remains a credit operation: commercial banks
receive money from the central bank against assets deposited, and pass on this money to customers.
This way commercial banks can becomemodern corporations and hence part of the game of differential
accumulation.
The debtors’s obligations were made transferable which turned them into commodities, e.g. “bonds”.
With the emergence of public banks, states would take credits from them against bonds whose interest
would be payed by money (issued by the same banks) raised from taxes [15]. The state thereby enforces
payment in the money issued by the law. If a taxpayer does not pay, the state would enforce its demand by
seizing some property. This way, the entire property base of the state (and subsequently capitalist society)
becomes the collateral to the money issued by central banks.
5.4 Credit paper as second order property
The owner of a bond will treat it as a normal asset, i.e. as part of their Vermögen (the interest are its earn-
ings), which may be disposed of as collateral in a credit operation. When commercial banks demanded
money from the central bank until recently sovereign bonds were usually handed in (or at least promised)
as collateral.
Bonds and other such transferable credit paper specify a right to the interest payment. This is earnings
from an item owned, the operational definition of property. Thus, a credit paper, while actually based on
(collateralised by) property becomes property itself. As such, it may itself be used as collateral for a credit
operation. In particular, bonds of states with
a) an extensive property base, i.e. much private ownership and a legal system which supports and
defends private ownership,
b) enforceable taxation (against that property) ,
c) fiscal policy with low risk of state default,
a generally thought of a best possible collateral.
Money, the means of payment, emerges out of credit operations backed by a societies property base. But
the transferable credit papers themselves become a property base of second order which may be used for
further credit operations. And these in turn may be used the same way and so on.
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5.5 Credit operation and risk creation
The fact that money is created only if there is a property backup and an interest payment in money means
that taken together the money available in a society is necessarily insufficient to pay off all debt plus
interest. This means that there must be some debtors who finds it difficult to raise the necessary money
by the business operation underlying their credit contract. They need to be inventive. But this changes the
social (and physical) formation away from what it was when the credit was contracted, the “assumptions”
underlying the contract change. This creates a particular kind of risk: the risk which is generated by the
very credit operation itself. There are of course many other risks i.e. unforeseen events.
In order the “manage” the risk of their debtors default they may buy a kind of insurance paper: e.g. some
other party may offer a paper whose issuer promises to take up payment if the debt defaults against a
small constant fee. Thus we enter the world of financial derivatives.
Another way of trying to overcome the risky ever changing world is to fix prices in the future (futures
contracts), i.e. to assume away that the world will change from now to when the payment is due.
Each of these derivatives, indeed what makes them actual derivatives is that they:
a) are based on some underlying contract (which may itself already be a derivative),
b) specify a right to earnings, sometimes conditional on some externality, and hence
c) are property, can be sold or otherwise transfered or used a a collateral in yet other credit operations.
5.6 Autocatalytic sprawl of credit and accumulation
“A single chemical reaction is said to be autocatalytic if one of the reaction products is also a catalyst for
the same or a coupled reaction. Such a reaction is called an autocatalytic reaction.” [41] We observe that
credit operations with transferable notes, money, has exactly this feature: there is not a reaction but and
action with a product: the credit. But
a) the product themselves are the foundation for further credit operations,
b) which are necessary because the interest (without which there would be no credit operations)
creates the need for more money that is available,
c) all of which creates risk which must be managed by further credit operations, the credit system is
operationally closed.
Hence, the credit system appears to expand chaotically or “sprawls” in an autocatalytic way. But there is
(cre-)order in the chaos, because of the interes to differentially accumulate by everybody involved.
Going back to capitalisation: the fact that earnings are denominated in money and usually payed in
money, and that money is created through credit, means that credit operations and hence the property
systems underlies capitalisation.
Accumulation, being a relative process, requires that earnings a greater than the average rate of return or
average interest rate. As a consequence this reinforces autocatalytic process now of capital accumulation:
since if there are some who beat the average there must be some who do not, by definition of the term
average. This of course creates defaults if businesses run on credit and increases risk with the same
consequences as above.
The processes of credit creations and differential accumulation are operationally closed: in order to
counter a problem created by these operations other operations within the same logic performed without
ever leaving the conceptual framework of capital accumulation.
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6 Bureaucracy
In his “Hierarchy Model of Income Distribution” Blair Fix discusses how position in hierarchy can be
translated into income: basically, income grows exponentially with position in hierarchy [17]. Bich-
ler/Nitzan ([4] commenting an earlier paper of Fix, [16]) note that hierarchical organisation is always a
power institution not just organisational convenience. In the following I will theorise that bureaucracy
is hierarchical organisation plus operational symbolism and is the other mode of rational mastery (the
former being capitalisation). Thus, Fix shows one kind of interaction of bureaucratic power and capital
power, but there are others, and the direction goes the other way round too.
6.1 Bureaucratic capitalism
Standard definition of bureaucracy (Max Weber [36]): a hierarchically ordered organisation in which a
higher level commands a level directly below by setting up usually generalised formal procedures and
courses of action whose results are assessed by the same or other bureaucratic organisations. Each level is
organised in departments with defined competences. Not only are almost all state organisations organised
according to those principles, but also bigger corporations.
Theories of “bureaucratic capitalism” flourished in the 1950s and 60s. Castoriadis and the Socialisme
ou Barbarie group developed theories of this type [1]. They are no longer in the focus of political theory
despite the still common complaints about bureacratisation [20].
6.2 The phases of global capitalisation
According to Bichler/Nitzan the process of the capitalisation of human societies from the late 19th
century took place in phases [29]. In each of these phases the accumulation process would eventually
hit an organisational barrier, or “envelope”. Through radical organisational re-formation (Umgestaltung)
capitalism was able to “break” these envelopes and proceed further until the process hit the next barrier.
a) The monopoly wave of the turn of the century occurred within individual industries;
b) the oligopoly wave of the 1920’s occurred within sectors;
c) the conglomerate wave of the 1960’s took place across the entire business sector at national level;
and
d) the wave of the 1980’s and 1990’s was, by and large, global.
We note that the first three “waves” took place within the legal and police framework of the nation states
(the first two including their colonies). One could say that the bureaucratic state was a formation of of
capitalist formation activity (Gestaltungstätigkeit), hence “capitalist state” = “state of capital” [29].
In theWestern states at the end of the 1960, that is when the theories of bureaucratic capitalism flourished,
the situation looked like this: many big corporations were either directly “socialised” (e.g. automotive
industry in France), operated like state institutions (e.g. aerospace: Pan Am as national carrier of USA), or
there were tight arrangements on the national level by leading politicians, business and trade unionist
leaders (“concerted action” in Germany). Many economic activities were traditionally state institutions
(electricity, postal service, telecommunications, many had been private enterprises in the middle of the
19th century) and, as such, not the direct target of the accumulation process. The “planification” (French
5-year plans of the national administration) of those corporations was similar to those in the Soviet bloc
(5-year plans etc.). And then there was the Eastern bloc of party-bureaucratic regimes (Soviet empire,
China, etc). So we can say that the organisational mode of pretty much of the world, whether “capitalist”
or “communist” was bureaucratic, hence the theories of bureaucratic capitalism seemed right.
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I turned out, however, that is was not the case that with global bureaucratisation the differential accumu-
lation process would cease to exist. On the contrary, the breakthrough of the national envelope from the
1970s of transnational capitalism created a new institutional formations and it became apparent that the
accumulation process had never gone away.
The breakdown of the of the Soviet bloc and the transformation process in China may be understood
as a (re-)capitalisation of their party-bureaucratic regimes either by transforming them directly into
Western-style capitalist regimes (Eastern Europe) or by a capitalisation of the state bureaucracy (Russia,
China).
Corporations and nation states are internally organised in a hierarchical fashion based on systems of
rules, that is, they are “internally” (organisationally) bureaucratic regimes. The “environment” of these
bureaucratic regimes, however, is differentially accumulating capitalism. The survival of a bureaucratic
organisation (state, corporation) depends on its successful differential accumulation.
6.3 The autocatalytic sprawl of bureaucratic organisation
In the idealised Weberian world, bureaucratic rules are “rational” and set up by disinterested persons /
organisations and are executed as written. In reality, everybody involved is interested in making a career,
not to work too much etc. Bureaucratic institutions are pervaded with power struggles: managers of lower
levels of the hierarchy try to rise and hence make informal arrangements, performmobbing, withhold
information etc. The subordinates either try to do the same or resist or try to keep out of the game. In any
case, the activities are motivated by goals that are “irrational” from a “higher” perspective and are not a
conceptual part of the bureaucratic schemes.
For its functioning, those who set up the bureaucratic rules require information about the processes to
order. But those affected will hold back any information if it is in their interest. Either because information
is power, or because tomuch information in superior levels of the organisation threatens the subordinates
with e.g. higher workload, unwanted regulations and suchlike. Hence bureaucratic rules are made without
the necessary information and are thus inadequate for its purpose which feeds back the irrationalities of
the system into the system and increases them further.
Management sets goals for the subordinates. Management also sets the rules under which the subordi-
nates should work. But the inadequacy of the rules force those who have to execute them continuously
to work against them to “get things done,” i.e. to achieve the goals. But working against the rules shows
disloyality to the management. So there is a double-bind either the rules must be broken or the goals are
not met. This inner contradiction of the bureaucratic regime further undermines its alleged rationality.
Occasionally, the irrationalities of the bureaucratic order are discovered by the management. The solution
is then to set up new bodies for inquiries, surveillance etc. Since these bodies are necessarily also
bureaucratic organisations (they have goals and “rationally” conceived rules), these attempts do no more
than to further increase the dysfunctionality of the system. In the USA, after “9/11” it was discovered that
the 13 secret service agencies did not cooperate properly, so another agency was created to coordinate the
secret service activities. In the GDR, the ruling party had to create an entire bureaucratic “state security”,
the Stasi, to make up for the lack of information about the goings on in society of the plan bureaucrats —
the Stasi was the biggest such organisation relative to population so far.
We have observed that capitalisation is operationally closed: if problems occur, due to its own logic, the
“solution” is more capitalisation. Similarly, if a problem occurs in a bureaucratic regime, new bureaucratic
rules or new bureaucratic organisations are created by the bureaucracy tomanage them. Thus, the bureau-
cratic logic is “operationally closed” in the above sense: bureaucracies create new bureaucracies. Further
more, the irrationalities of bureaucracy create the need for the generation of new bureaucracies. Just as
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finance, bureaucratic regimes are “autocatalytic,” they grow indefinitely by way of their own processing in
a seemingly chaotic way,hence we observe an autocatalytic sprawl of bureaucratic organisation.
7 The interaction between bureaucracy and capitalisation
The intrinsic irrationalities of bureaucratic institutions are confined to some extent by the need for survival
in differentially accumulating capitalism. So “internal rationality” of a bureaucratic organisation is a
function of the “external rationality” of differential capital accumulation.
But we already saw that the autocatalytic sprawl of finance is a result of its inner contradictions which
already turn its rationality into a pseudorationality. Furthermore capitalisation it is the “implementation”
of power struggles byway of the syntacticmachine of capitalisation. In order to defend financial capitalism
as rational, power struggles would have to be defended as “rational”. The usual way to do this seems to
be to say that power struggles belong to the “human nature.” So, capitalism is a “second nature” (Marx)
but as such adequate for human beings. Such an argument, of course, ignores the fact that in addition
to fighting each other all the time at the same time people cooperate all the time too. Indeed, if, within
a business corporation, everybody would act as a capitalist towards each other (e.g. the secretary give
out paper only against payment by the employee demanding it etc.) the corporation would immediately
break down.
On any hierarchy level, information is a power tool in the career and hence not available to higher or lower
order if possible (which undermines the rationality of the process). Contracts are signed with the limited
information each of the contracting side has about the situation they are in. Thus, in both, bureaucracy
and capitalisation intelligence, the collection of information relevant to the power struggle is a primary
concern. Research is needed, but this might explain the enormous growth of the information sector
and in particular, because all of this take place within the context of modern rationality, the computing
technologies (big data, Google, and so on).
Fix shows how persons in bureaucratic hierarchies capitalise their position in the hierarchy [17]. This is, of
course, is another motivation for the internal power struggles: making a career in such a hierarchy raises
both management power and financial power. The ultimate turnover from hierarchical / bureaucratic
to capital power may be seen in the “management buyout”, i.e. when topmanagers directly turn their
accumulated position-relative top-income into ownership of the very organisation they already control
by top-position within the bureaucratic power structure.
It would be interesting to investigate the relations of firms size in terms of number of employees, firm
size in terms of capitalisation and number of hierarchical levels. Also: how did the size distribution (both
ways) develop with time, i.e. is there a trend to bigger and bigger firms of not? One would think that
bureaucratic hierarchies might grow too big and that eventually their inner contradictions work against
their success in differential accumulations, so there should be a movement back and forth frommergers
and acquisitions to outsourcing.
It would also be interesting to know if internal breadth = mergers and acquisitions [29] is the preferred
mode of differential accumulation not only because it is the path of least resistance but also because it
allows direct hierarchical control of the acquired organisation.
Occasionally, the idea comes up that the irrationalities of financial capitalism should be “regulated”
either by new laws and prescriptions, or even socialisation. But this of course would just create new
bureaucratic institutions. Proposals of the other way round also exist (particularly in the 1980s to 2000s):
the irrationalities of state bureaucracy may be lessened by privatisation, i.e. by splitting up a larger state
institution in smaller parts and sell them on the market as new business enterprises. Apart form the fact
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that the inner regime of these new businesses will remain bureaucratic, they will now be directly subject
to the irrationalities of differential accumulation (in addition, privatisation frequently creates the need for
regulation of the new business field). The picture we get is a kind of pingpong game between the ever
growing two forms of pseudorational pseudomastery over social organisation.
We get the picture that the capital and bureaucratic modes of pseudorational mastery can “overcome”
their operational closedness by changing to the respective other mode, only to run into the irrationalities
of that. Rational mastery, with its twomodes capitalisation and bureaucracy is an endless agony which
generates more of itself out of itself, hence the autocatalytic sprawl of pseudorational pseudomastery.
8 Systemic crisis or autocatalytic agony?
Bichler/Nitzan advance a theory of systemic crisis [5]. The thesis may be summarised thus: capitalisation
is the discounting of expected future income. There are times in which indeed actual income trails its
expectations by years. There are other times when actual income and expectations occur are nearly at the
same time. Let us call the lag “temporal expectation horizon” or just “expectation horizon” (my term). A
shrinking of the expectation horizon near zero destroys the machinery of capitalisation because there
is no longer a kind of foreseeable future. This indicates a “systemic crisis.” Bichler/Nitzan perform an
aggregate analysis to make their claims (while normally arguing against aggregate analysis).
Before we investigate the notion “systemic” in the light of the SIS concept of Castoriadis (which Bich-
ler/Nitzan do not use), let us see if a shrinking time horizon is necessarily a sign of a systemic crisis.
Suppose by way of “imagined reality” at a given time a particular capitalist regime consists of two “core
capitals” A and B. Assume A is old and very big, B is new and small. The aggregate capitalisation of A
and B will be dominated by A. Now, suppose the investors loose faith in the future of A-type business,
perhaps because the profit margins are shrinking rapidly, while B-type businesses are celebrated as the
new hype and have high profit rates. In such a case the expectation horizon of A will shrink to zero while
that of B may still be several years. In the aggregate, because of the still dominant A, it will look like “all of
capitalism” is in a crisis, i.e. that there is a systemic crisis, whereas a disaggregate analysis would show
that a change in dominant capital is under way. Thus, an agregate expectation horizon is not a sufficient
criterion for systemic crisis.
The more fundamental questions here are: is the conceptual toolset of Capital As Power able to discover a
truly systemic crisis? And what does the term “systemic” mean?
If we theorise capitalism with the conceptual framework of the double SIS of modernity, the autonomy
project versus rational mastery, according to Castoriadis, the autonomy project is in decline since the
1950s (“rising tide of insignificancy”, “world in fragments” etc. [7,8]), the movements of the late 1960s were
only the last reappearance of this project. The world is more and more governed by the SIS of rational
mastery, the autocatalytic sprawl of bureaucracy. To the latter we can add the equally autocatalytic growth
of capitalisation. But there is a problem for the process of ever increasing rational mastery: during its
entire history it was always challenged by the autonomy project. The dynamics of the Western socio-
historic was driven by the antinomy of autonomy versus rational mastery. But with the autonomy SIS
withering away the control project looses its “direction” so to say.
There may be another fundamental problem for the capitalist accumulation to continue. The transnation-
alisation of capital accumulation means that the accumulation process has left the institutional “bed”
of the nation state. But the nation state institutions formed a framework or playground in which the
accumulation process could take place. Further more, the nation state had a legitimacy: the imaginary of
the nation, or nationalism. Nations are “imagined communities”, to take up Benedikt Andersons notion
[2], a member of a nation, a citizen, can lead ameaningful life if it supports his nation (“right or wrong, my
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country”). Nationalism, as an SIS, emerged in the 17th century and, at least in the 20th century, proved
stronger than other imaginaries, in particular than the working class movement which can be understood
as one “branch” of the autonomy project [10]. As Pohrt observes: in WWI the workers went to what for
many of them became their “last struggle” (line in the International), but not against capitalism, but
against their coworkers in the opposite trench, each in the name of their respective nation and for the
respective capitalist elites [30].
For transnational capitalism, an equally strong collective SIS that can act as a legitimacy generator does
not exist. There have been attempts to create transnational imagined communities. Perhaps the most
ambitious project of this type is, or was the European Union. The “European identity” was supposed
to eventually end in the creation of the “United States of Europe”. But the attempt to create a European
constitution was voted down by the citizens of France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, countries that
were supposedly strong supporters of the “European movement”. And now we have “Brexit” and the
zombieesque resurgence of nationalist parties and ideologies. Other attempts to build up a system of
transnational institutions are continuously marred by resistance, protests, etc. including calls to national
authorities to take back what was already contracted (currently protests against CETA and TTIP, in the
2010s we saw “Occupy”, before that the series of G8 summit protests, in the 1990s action against “MIA”,
etc.).
Finally, as far as the transnationalisation process goes, it necessarily undermines the organisational
power of the nation states, i.e. the state bureaucracies. The result is an increasing number of “failed
states”, a phenomenon which starts to reach the “capitalist center” (Greece, Mexico). A “failed state”
could be defined as a formerly a bureaucratic entity which was no longer able survive the transnational
accumulation process, and in which neither pseudorational bureaucracy nor finance rule, but anarchy
and/or barbarism. (Wemay include wannabe such entities, e.g. in the case of South Sudan society went
from “national liberation” to failed state without ever formaing a functional nation state bureaucracy
unless you count the previous regime of Sudan.) Thus, transnationalisation without a nation state
replacement may well undermine its own foundation in the long run.
The situation should perhaps not be described, neither as “systemic” and nor as a “crisis”. In the Hippo-
cratic sense, crisis would mean that the situation has reached a point of decision, kairos, when the patient
either dies or recovers. The present, however, looks more like a steady decay: with the SIS of autonomy
long in decline that of rational control may be also in decline due to its own success, and without a point
of decision in sight.
If neither autonomy nor rational mastery are significant to people any longer, some seem to resort to
nationalism or religion. But these SIS do not seem to be sustainable institution generators anymore either.
Were religion or nationalism rules, we find corruption, gangsterism, or outright barbarism (ISIS).
All in all, there might well be a situation of decline of all imaginary significations that once generated
social formations, i.e. not just the SIS of autonomy but also of rational mastery. But such a decline would
be outside of the conceptual reach of a theory that is designed to analyse the generative processes of a
particular SIS, such as Capital As Power is for the financial part of rational mastery.
9 Way out? Autonomy and operational symbolism
Is there a way out of the mess of the autocatalytic sprawl of pseudorational pseudomastery?
I have argued that operational symbolism is unavoidable in that previous symbolism failed. In addition
modern science, properly understood, is part of the SIS of autonomy: it is the rejection of authority (God,
holy books, tradition, etc.) when it comes to the question of what is actually the case. Instead, empirical
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investigation and critique are the activities to advance human knowledge. Symbolic machines, the
possibility to construct unlimited many provide a unparalleled liberty. And also, there are soon 10 billion
people on Earth who need food, housing etc which cannot possibly be provided without application of
technology = science-based technique.
Since modern rationality when combined with mastery yields autocatalytic agony, the “solution” may lie
in a new attempt for autonomy which does not reject the “power” of modern science: rational autonomy.
In sec. 3 we saw that all societies create the order of it (the nomos) themselves, the difference between
heteronomy and autonomy was that in a heteronomous society its members think that the nomos
comes from somewhere else and is essentially unchangeable whereas in an autonomous society its
members take advantage of the selfcreation of the nomos which they consciously create. For a modern
autonomous society to be truly democratic all of its members must have the same right to participate in
that selfcreation.
By these standards, no fully autonomous society has ever existed. Yet according to Castoriadis there are
two instances in human history when the imaginary of autonomy existed, the Athenian polis of antiquity
(roughly 8th to 4th century BC) and in modernity (since the 12th century AD). In Athens it was limited by
not including most of the population (women, slaves, foreigners) and by not including all social spheres
(e.g. the oikos or private business, was not regulated by the polis); in modernity these limitations do no
longer exist in principle, but instead it is the other imaginary of modernity, rational mastery, which limits
and continuously cuts back the imaginary of autonomy to the point of making it almost vanishing (the
“rising tide of insignificancy” [8]).
9.1 Inspirations from the Athenian polis
According to Castoriadis, there are enough questions raised by the Athenians and institutional solutions
found whichmay still be relevant for a revival of the autonomy project. Athens is not amodel, but a source
or germ [9,12,13].
a) Drawing office holders by the lot rather than electing them. Elections, the election of the “best”
(aristos) is an aristocratic institutions [see now also . . . , Against Elections, 2016]. Drawing by the lot
assume total equality of the selected.
b) There was an extensive court system. Even decisions by the ecclesia (assembly of the citizens) could
be brought before the courts and be rules illegal.
c) There were institutions to warn against hubris, e.g. the Athenian theater.
d) There were measures taken to prevent private interest to enter decisions about commonmatters.
E.g. in decisions about peace or war, citizens with property close to the city’s walls were excluded.
9.2 Inspirations from CERN
Can we find organisations which can give us some inspiration (not a model!) in what direction to look for
the combination of modern rationality and autonomy? I think the research “machine” CERN in Geneva
may offer something here because it combined a relatively flat hierarchy and democratic decisionmaking-
process (at least according to the researches by Knorr-Cetina, [21,23]) with modern science i.e. modern
rationality.
a) There are few hierarchical levels and higher levels cannot give much orders to lowers: the machine
is so complex that only a few persons will understand the particular work hence no one else can
command them. (It is commonly assumed that a democracy proper must be simple enough so that
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everybody can replace everyone. At CERN the opposite is true: they are equal because no one can
replace the other because they do not understand (in detail) what they do.
b) There is no assignment of authorship. Any publication of one of the collaborations bears the
names of all members whether Nobel prize winner of apprentice. (Example: the announcement
of the ATLAS collaboration of the discovery of the Higgs boson lists all 2932 members by name
in alphabetical order [3].) The understanding is that the machine would not work without the
contribution of any of them and that there is no way to tell, which contribution is more important
than the other.
c) Experiments like the ATLAS detector are the most complex machines ever created. It should be
possible, therefore, to find inspiration there to organize the creation andmaintenance of any other
other technical system (railway system, aircraft,. . . ) in a relatively power free way since these
will likely be technologically much simpler. The picture here would be a world in which all the
technological infrastructure is socially organised into autonomous collaborations.
The idea is not to idealise CERN or any other organisation wemay find for inspiration (Bichler/Nitzan cite
the US Tennessee Valley Authority [4], one could also mention the free software movement, in particular
its more radical branches who try to make reappropriation of their creations impossible via suitable
license arrangements e.g. “copyleft” [18] and are consequently less popular with business than more
“liberal” projects and licenses), indeed all of them operate in the context of rational mastery (capitalism
and state bureaucracy) and its members were socialised in that. So a more thorough investigation of this
will have to deal with the problems such organisations face and if these are intrinsic or the result of them
being embedded in capitalism.
In a collaboration (or cooperative, to use the older term) people work together but otherwise live their
private lives. More generally the question is how can all the people of the world (now 10 billion) live
together in a global convivum or cosmopolis?
10 References
[1] Jean Amair, Hugo Bell, Cornelius Castoriadis, S. Chatel, Claude Lefort, Jean-François Lyotard, Daniel
Monthé, Panonicus, Paul Romano, Albert Véga, and Jack Weinberg. 2017. A Socialisme ou Barbarie
Anthology: Autonomy, Critique, Revolution in the Age of Bureaucratic Capitalism. notbored.org, Brooklin
NY. Retrieved from notbored.org
[2] Benedict Anderson. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
Verso.
[3] The ATLAS Collaboration. 2012. Observation of a new particle in the search for the Standard Model
Higgs boson with the ATLAS detector at the LHC. Physics Letters B 716, 1: 1–29.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physletb.2012.08.020
[4] Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan. 2017. Growing through Sabotage: Energizing Hierarchical
Power. Retrieved May 7, 2018 from http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/512/
[5] Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan. 2018. With Their Back to the Future. Working Papers on
Capital as Power 2018, 1. Retrieved from http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/534/
[6] Cornelius Castoriadis. 1987. The Imaginary Institution of Society. The MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
[7] Cornelius Castoriadis. 1997. World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the
Imagination. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA.
[8] Cornelius Castoriadis. 2003. The Rising Tide of Insignificancy (The Big Sleep). Notbored.org, Brooklin
18
U. Martin (2018) Autocatalytic Sprawl (v.0.12)
NY. Retrieved January 5, 2010 from http://www.notbored.org/RTI.pdf
[9] Cornelius Castoriadis. 1991 (1982). The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy. In Philosophy,
Politics, Autonomy. Oxford University Press, New York, 81–123.
[10] Cornelius Castoriadis. 1993 (1976). The Question of the History of The Workers’ Movement. In
Political and Social Writings. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 157–206.
[11] Cornelius Castoriadis. 1997 (1989). Done and To Be Done. In The Castoriadis Reader. Blackwell,
Oxford, 361–417. Retrieved from
https://becomingpoor.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/the-castoriadis-reader.pdf
[12] Cornelius Castoriadis. 1997 (1991). The Greek and the Modern Political Imaginary. InWorld in
Fragments. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 84–107.
[13] Cornelius Castoriadis. 2003 (1993). The Athenian Democracy: False and True Questions. In The
Rising Tide of Insignificancy (The Big Sleep). Notbored.org, Brooklin NY, 311–328. Retrieved from
http://www.notbored.org/RTI.pdf
[14] Carl von Clausewitz. 1943. On war. Modern Library, New York.
[15] Johannes Gerard van Dillen. 1934. History of the principal public banks accompanied by extensive
bibliographies of the history of banking and credit in eleven European countries. Mouton, The Hague.
[16] Blair Fix. 2017. Energy and institution size. PLOS ONE 12, 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0171823
[17] Blair Fix. 2018. A Hierarchy Model of Income Distribution. Working Papers on Capital as Power 2018,
2. Retrieved from http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/540/
[18] Free Software Foundation. 2007. GNU General Public License Version 3. Retrieved May 11, 2018 from
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
[19] David Graeber. 2014. Debt: the first 5,000 years. Melville House, Brooklyn, NY.
[20] David Graeber. 2016. The utopia of rules: on technology, stupidity, and the secret joys of bureaucracy.
Melville House, Brooklin NY.
[21] Johann Grolle. 2008. Ein Urknall auf Erden. Spiegel 2008, 27: 102–113. Retrieved from
http://hep.ph.liv.ac.uk/%7Emklein/lhcPR/Spiegel_37_08_Ein_Urknall_auf_Erden.pdf
[22] Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger. 2009. Eigentum, Zins und Geld: Ungelöste Rätsel der
Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Metropolis, Marburg.
[23] Karin Knorr Cetina. 1999. Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Harvard Univ Press,
Cambridge MA.
[24] Gerhard Köbler. 2014. Indogermanisches Woerterbuch. Innsbruck. Retrieved September 13, 2016
from http://www.koeblergerhard.de/idgwbhin.html
[25] Sybille Krämer. 1988. Symbolische Maschinen. Die Idee der Formalisierung in geschichtlichem Abriss.
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt.
[26] Sybille Krämer. 1991. Berechenbare Vernunft: Kalkül und Rationalismus im 17. Jahrhundert. de
Gruyter, Berlin.
[27] Legifrance. 2018. Code civil. Retrieved April 19, 2018 from
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721
[28] Donald MacKenzie. 2008. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets. MIT Press,
19
U. Martin (2018) Autocatalytic Sprawl (v.0.12)
Cambridge MA.
[29] Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler. 2009. Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder.
Routledge, New York and London. Retrieved from bnarchives.yorku.ca/259/
[30] Wolfgang Pohrt. 2012. Kapitalismus forever: über Krise, Krieg, Revolution, Evolution, Christentum und
Islam. Edition Tiamat, Berlin.
[31] Arno Ros. 1989. Begründung und Begriff: Wandlungen des Verständnisses begrifflicher
Argumentationen. Meiner, Hamburg.
[32] Hans-Joachim Stadermann. 2006. Nominalökonomik. Mohr Siebek, Tübingen.
[33] Otto Steiger and Hans-Joachim Stadermann. 2001. Schulökonomik. Mohr Siebek, Tübingen.
[34] Peter Suchsland. 1968. Deutsche Volksbücher. Aufbau, Berlin undWeimar.
[35] Ernst Tugendhat. 1982. Traditional and analytical philosophy: lectures on the philosophy of language.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK; New York.
[36] Max Weber. 2013. Economy and society. University of California Press, Berkeley CA.
[37] Ludwig Wittgenstein. 1958. Philosophical investigations. Blackwell, Oxford.
[38] Wörterbuchnetz. 2011. Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm undWilhelm Grimm. Retrieved
September 13, 2016 from
http://woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB/?sigle=DWB&mode=Vernetzung&lemid=GV02805#XGV02805
[39] 2014. Eigentum. Rechtslexikon. Retrieved May 12, 2018 from
http://www.rechtslexikon.net/d/eigentum/eigentum.htm
[40] 2018. Eigentum. jura-basic. Retrieved May 12, 2018 from http://kauf.jura-basic.de/
[41] 2018. Autocatalysis. Wikipedia. Retrieved May 12, 2018 from
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Autocatalysis&oldid=840644428
20
